Passkey vs password: what the 2026 statistics say, and when you still need a password
In the passkey vs password question, a passkey is safer for any account that supports it: it cannot be phished, reused or stolen from the website's servers. Passwords still matter for accounts without passkey support, for recovery and for your password manager. In 2026, 75% of consumers had enabled at least one passkey.
Key takeaways
- The FIDO Alliance estimated 5 billion passkeys in use worldwide on 7 May 2026. That figure is an estimate built from public and member data.
- In an April 2026 survey of 11,000 consumers in ten countries, 90% knew what passkeys are, 75% had enabled one on at least some accounts and 49% used them whenever possible or most of the time.
- Microsoft reported in May 2025 that passkey sign-ins succeed about 98% of the time against 32% for passwords, and are eight times faster than a password plus multi-factor authentication.
- Passwords are far from gone: 57% of organisations still use a phishable method for employees' main daily sign-in, and 11% use a password alone.
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 (31 July 2025) allows synced passkeys at AAL2 and says AAL2 verifiers shall offer a phishing-resistant option, but bans syncable authenticators at AAL3.
- Keep a strong password, or better a long passphrase, for your password manager, device sign-in, recovery and any site without passkeys.
What is the difference between a passkey and a password?
A password is a secret you know and type, and the website keeps something derived from it to check against. A passkey is a pair of cryptographic keys: the private key stays on your device or in your password manager, and the website keeps only the public key, which is useless to a thief.
When you sign in with a passkey, the website sends a random challenge, your device signs it with the private key after you confirm with a fingerprint, face or PIN, and the website checks the signature with the public key. Nothing secret crosses the network, and nothing secret is stored on the server.
Three one-line definitions used throughout this page:
- Passkey: a FIDO credential based on the WebAuthn standard, tied to one website, released only by your device.
- Synced passkey: a passkey copied across your devices by a sync service such as Apple, Google, Microsoft or a password manager. NIST calls these "syncable authenticators".
- Device-bound passkey: a passkey that cannot leave one device, such as a hardware security key.
How does signing in with a passkey work?
Signing in with a passkey takes two steps from you, choosing the account and confirming with your face, fingerprint or PIN, while your device and the website exchange a signed challenge in the background. Creating one is a single prompt.
Creating a passkey
- You sign in to a site the usual way and choose "create a passkey", or accept the site's prompt.
- Your device asks you to confirm with your face, fingerprint or device PIN.
- Your device creates a new key pair just for that site. The private key is stored on the device or in your sync service; the public key is sent to the site.
- The site saves the public key against your account. Nothing secret has left your device.
Signing in
- You visit the site and choose to sign in with a passkey, or your browser offers it automatically.
- The site sends a random challenge.
- Your device checks that the site's domain matches the passkey, then asks you to confirm with your face, fingerprint or PIN.
- Your device signs the challenge with the private key and sends back the signature.
- The site checks the signature with the public key it stored. If it matches, you are in.
Step 3 of signing in is where phishing fails. A fake site has a different domain, so your device has no passkey to offer it.
Passkey vs password: side-by-side comparison
Passkeys win on phishing resistance, breach resistance and reuse, while passwords win on universal support and on working without a particular device or account ecosystem. The table sets out the trade-offs.
| Question | Password | Passkey |
|---|---|---|
| What the site stores | A hash of your secret | A public key only |
| Server breach exposes | Hashes that can be cracked | Nothing that signs you in |
| Can be phished | Yes, typed into fake sites | No, bound to the real site |
| Can be reused | Yes, and often is | No, one per site |
| You must remember it | Yes, or store it | No, confirm with face, finger or PIN |
| Works on every site | Yes | Only where supported |
| Lost device | Not affected | Recover via sync or a backup method |
| Shared accounts | Easy to share | Harder; share via a password manager |
The key row is the second one. When a website that uses passwords is breached, attackers get hashes they can try to crack, and the cracked passwords work wherever they were reused. When a website that uses passkeys is breached, attackers get public keys, which cannot be used to sign in anywhere. Our tracker of data breaches in 2026 shows how often password hashes still leak.
Passkey statistics for 2026
Passkeys reached mass adoption between 2024 and 2026. The FIDO Alliance's 2026 survey found 90% awareness and 75% of consumers using passkeys on at least some accounts, and estimated 5 billion passkeys in use.
| Statistic | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Passkeys in use worldwide (estimate) | 5 billion | FIDO Alliance, 7 May 2026 |
| Consumers aware of passkeys | 90% | FIDO survey, April 2026 |
| Not familiar at all | 7% | FIDO survey, April 2026 |
| Enabled on at least some accounts | 75% | FIDO survey, April 2026 |
| Enabled on most apps and accounts | 40% | FIDO survey, April 2026 |
| Use passkeys whenever possible or most of the time | 49% | FIDO survey, April 2026 |
| Prefer passkeys over passwords at that frequency | 48% | FIDO survey, April 2026 |
| Opt in when prompted at that frequency | 46% | FIDO survey, April 2026 |
The consumer survey was run online by Sapio Research in April 2026 among 11,000 adults who regularly log in to online services in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, China and India, with a margin of error of plus or minus 0.9 percentage points. The 5 billion figure is not a survey result; the FIDO Alliance calculated it from publicly available data and its own deployment data.
By region
| Region | Enabled passkeys | Habitual use | Compromise or breach notice |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global | 75% | 49% | 33% |
| United States | 74% | 48% | 41% |
| Europe (UK, France, Germany) | 70% | 46% | 31% |
| Asia Pacific | 77% | 51% | 30% |
Within the regions, China and India led on adoption at 88% each, and the UK (77%) was ahead of Germany (70%) and France (64%). The United States stood out on harm: 41% of US consumers had a confirmed compromise or a breach notification in the past year, ten points above Europe and Asia Pacific.
Are passkeys more secure than passwords?
Yes. Passkeys are more secure than passwords because they resist phishing by design, cannot be reused across sites, and leave nothing on the server that an attacker could use to sign in. Their weak points are the device and the account that syncs them, not the website.
The phishing resistance comes from how the browser handles the passkey. A passkey is bound to the website's domain. If you land on a look-alike site, your device simply has no passkey for that domain, so there is nothing to hand over. A password, by contrast, can be typed into any page that looks right. NIST's SP 800-63B-4 describes this as verifier name binding and gives WebAuthn, the standard behind passkeys, as the example.
Passwords remain the root of many attacks. The FIDO survey found that 33% of consumers had a confirmed account compromise or breach notice in the past year: 17% knew for certain that at least one account was compromised, and 16% had received a notice that their password or data was exposed. Microsoft said in May 2025 that it observed 7,000 password attacks per second during 2024, more than double the 2023 rate.
Where passkeys can still fail
- The sync account: a synced passkey is only as safe as the Apple, Google, Microsoft or password manager account that holds it. That account needs a strong password or passphrase and a second factor.
- Malware on the device: malware cannot copy a passkey and replay it elsewhere the way it can steal a password, but it can act on your behalf while you are signed in to the device.
- Weak recovery: if a site lets you reset your account with a text message or an email link, an attacker can go around the passkey. Your account is only as strong as its recovery route.
- Exportability: 39% of organisations with technical concerns in the FIDO survey named risk around synced passkey exportability. This is why NIST bans syncable authenticators at its highest assurance level.
Passkeys vs passwords plus MFA: which second factors stop phishing?
Only cryptographic methods such as passkeys and hardware security keys stop phishing; codes you type, whether from SMS, email or an authenticator app, can be relayed by a fake site in real time. That is the main reason a password plus a one-time code is not equal to a passkey.
| Method | Phishing resistant? | Main weakness |
|---|---|---|
| Password only | No | Reuse, phishing, breaches |
| Password plus SMS code | No | SIM swap, relayed codes |
| Password plus email code | No | Email takeover, relayed codes |
| Password plus authenticator app code | No | Relayed codes on fake sites |
| Password plus push approval | No | Approval fatigue |
| Synced passkey | Yes | Depends on the sync account |
| Device-bound passkey or security key | Yes | Needs a backup key |
NIST SP 800-63B-4 says manual entry methods, such as one-time passwords and out-of-band codes, are not phishing resistant. The FIDO workforce survey found that 28% of organisations use a password plus an authenticator app as the main daily sign-in and 18% a password plus an SMS or email code. Both are far better than a password alone, but neither stops a well-built phishing page.
The top reason organisations gave for adopting passkeys was protection against phishing and MFA fatigue, chosen by 39% globally and 46% in the US.
Synced or device-bound: which kind of passkey should you use?
For most people, synced passkeys are the right choice, because they follow you to a new phone and cannot be lost with one device. Device-bound passkeys, such as hardware security keys, suit high-risk accounts and workplaces that need the highest assurance level.
| Feature | Synced passkey | Device-bound passkey |
|---|---|---|
| Where the key lives | Your devices, via a sync service | One device or security key |
| Lost phone | Restored on a new device | Gone; needs a backup |
| NIST level | Up to AAL2 | Up to AAL3 |
| Best for | Everyday personal accounts | Admins, journalists, high-value accounts |
Organisations are using both. In the FIDO survey, 50% of deploying organisations used a mix, 23% mainly synced passkeys and 22% mainly device-bound ones. Europe split more evenly, with 26% each for synced-only and device-bound-only.
The cost of forgotten passwords
Forgotten passwords cost businesses sales: 47% of consumers in the FIDO 2026 survey said they were likely to abandon a purchase or sign-in when they cannot remember a password, and 17% said they were highly likely to. Passkeys remove the thing people forget.
| Region or country | Likely to abandon over a forgotten password |
|---|---|
| Global | 47% |
| United States | 51% |
| Europe | 49% |
| Asia Pacific | 45% |
| India (highest) | 64% |
| Japan (lowest) | 25% |
Microsoft's figures point the same way from the other side. Its May 2025 post said passkey users were three times more successful at signing in, about 98% against 32% for passwords, and that passkey sign-ins were eight times faster than a password plus multi-factor authentication. It also said over 99% of people who sign in to Windows with a Microsoft account use Windows Hello, and that a passwordless-preferred sign-in flow cut password use by over 20% in its experiments.
What a server breach exposes: a worked comparison
When a password site is breached, the attacker gets something they can test offline; when a passkey site is breached, they get nothing that signs anyone in. Here is the difference worked through for one account.
Imagine an online shop with one million users is breached and its account table is stolen.
- Password site, fast hash: the table holds password hashes. The attacker runs a cracking tool. At this site's own reference rate of 10 billion guesses a second against a fast hash, a random 8 character password with about 51.5 bits of entropy falls in roughly 44 hours on average, and common passwords fall in seconds. Every cracked password is then tried on email, banking and shopping sites.
- Password site, slow hash: with Argon2id or bcrypt, each guess costs far more, so only weak and common passwords fall quickly. Reused passwords that appear in breach lists still fall first.
- Passkey site: the table holds public keys. A public key cannot be turned back into the private key and cannot sign a login challenge. The attacker gets the email addresses and whatever else the table held, but no way to sign in to that account or any other.
That is why the two most useful things you can do after any breach are to stop reusing passwords and to switch accounts to passkeys where possible.
Can I still use a password if I have a passkey?
Usually yes. Most websites that support passkeys keep your password as a fallback, so adding a passkey does not remove the password unless you choose to. Microsoft is an exception for new accounts, which it made passwordless by default in May 2025.
A remaining password is a remaining weakness. If a site lets you remove the password after adding a passkey, and you have a reliable recovery method, removing it closes the door phishing uses. If it does not, make sure the remaining password is unique and long, at least 16 random characters from the 16 character generator, so a breach elsewhere cannot be replayed against it.
Where passkeys are winning at work
Most large organisations are now deploying passkeys for staff, but passwords still dominate daily sign-in. The FIDO Alliance's 2026 workforce survey of 1,400 decision-makers at organisations with 500 or more employees found 68% deploying, rolling out or piloting passkeys.
| Workforce statistic | Value |
|---|---|
| Deploying, rolling out or piloting passkeys | 68% |
| Fully passwordless already | 28% |
| Fully passwordless as a goal reached or pursued | 82% |
| Phishable method as main daily sign-in | 57% |
| Password plus authenticator app as main sign-in | 28% |
| Password plus SMS or email code as main sign-in | 18% |
| Password only as main sign-in | 11% |
| Passkey as main sign-in | 30% |
| Confident they can recover access if a passkey is lost | 89% |
The survey's own summary puts it plainly: deploying passkeys and eliminating passwords are not the same thing. Organisations that had started reported faster logins (45%), fewer password reset tickets (35%) and fewer phishing incidents (32%). The most common reasons for not going fully passwordless were that passwords plus MFA felt sufficient (16%), legacy system compatibility (16%) and account recovery (16%).
The US led on full passwordless status at 37%, against 21% in Europe. Half of deploying organisations used a mix of synced and device-bound passkeys, rather than one type.
Why some organisations are not switching yet
The barriers organisations report are practical rather than technical doubts about passkeys: old systems that cannot accept them, budget, and worries about recovery. In the FIDO 2026 workforce survey, 38% named compatibility with legacy internal systems as a barrier.
- Compatibility with legacy internal systems: 38%.
- Getting budget approval: 35%.
- Device recovery and account restoration: 33%.
- Prioritising against other security work: 33%.
- Lack of internal expertise: 32%.
- Employee buy-in: 30%.
Among organisations without passkey plans in the next 24 months, 24% were waiting for the technology and standards to mature and 21% believed their current MFA was good enough. Shared devices, such as kiosks and frontline terminals, were a specific concern for 39% of organisations with technical barriers. Recovery fears seem to ease with experience: 89% of organisations said they were confident they could restore access if a passkey was lost.
For individuals, the same lesson applies at a smaller scale. The barrier is rarely the passkey itself; it is the old account that does not support one, and the recovery route you never set up.
What do NIST and regulators say about passkeys?
NIST SP 800-63B-4, finalised on 31 July 2025, treats synced passkeys as acceptable multi-factor cryptographic authenticators at Authentication Assurance Level 2, requires AAL2 verifiers to offer a phishing-resistant option, and forbids syncable authenticators at AAL3, which needs a non-exportable key.
- Syncable authenticators are covered under section 3.1.7, with detailed requirements in Appendix B, including requirements for the sync fabric.
- Phishing resistance (section 3.2.5) is the ability of the protocol to stop secrets being disclosed to an impostor without relying on the user's vigilance. Codes you type, from SMS or an app, are not phishing resistant.
- AAL2 verifiers "SHALL offer at least one phishing-resistant authentication option", according to section 2.2.
- AAL3 requires a non-exportable private key, so it needs a device-bound passkey such as a hardware security key.
NIST's guidance is reaching other rules too. The IRS's Publication 1345 (Rev. 10-2026) for tax preparers requires identity verification for electronic signatures to follow NIST SP 800-63-4. For passwords, the same NIST revision requires at least 15 characters when a password is the only factor; our NIST password guidelines page covers those rules.
When should you keep a password?
Keep a password wherever passkeys are not supported, for the account that protects your passkeys, and for anything you must type on a device you do not own. Use this table to decide for each account.
| Account or situation | Best choice | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Email, Apple, Google, Microsoft account | Passkey plus strong backup | Resets everything else |
| Bank or broker offering passkeys | Passkey | High value, phishing target |
| Password manager master password | Long passphrase | Opens every other secret |
| Computer or phone sign-in | Biometric plus a strong PIN or passphrase | The PIN is the fallback |
| Site without passkey support | Unique random password | No other option yet |
| Shared family or team account | Password in a shared vault | Easier to share safely |
| Wi-Fi network | Random password | Passkeys do not apply |
| Older work systems | Password plus MFA | Legacy compatibility |
For the passwords that remain, the rule is simple: random, long and unique. The password generator makes them in your browser and never sends them anywhere. For the master password you must remember, a six word passphrase from the EFF list carries about 77.5 bits of entropy and is far easier to type than 12 random symbols. Wi-Fi keys have their own generator: the Wi-Fi password generator.
How to switch to passkeys: a migration checklist
Switch your most important accounts first, starting with email and the account that syncs your passkeys, then banks and shopping, and leave low-value accounts for when you next log in. Each switch takes a minute or two.
- Secure the sync account first. Whether that is Apple, Google, Microsoft or a password manager, give it a strong passphrase and a second factor. Every synced passkey depends on it.
- Add a passkey to your main email. Your email can reset most other accounts, so it comes next.
- Add passkeys to your bank, broker and payment accounts where offered.
- Add passkeys to shopping accounts with saved cards.
- Register a second passkey or backup method on each important account, such as a second device or a hardware key, so losing a phone does not lock you out.
- Remove or strengthen the old password. If the site allows passkey-only sign-in and you have a good backup, remove the password. If not, replace it with a unique random one.
- Check recovery routes. If a site can reset your account by SMS alone, that is now the weakest link.
- Keep going as you log in. When a site offers to create a passkey, accept it.
Passkeys for families and less confident users
Passkeys are often easier than passwords for family members who struggle with them, because there is nothing to remember or type. The work is in the set-up: one sync account per person, a backup device, and a written recovery plan.
- One person, one sync account. Each family member should have their own Apple, Google or Microsoft account, or their own password manager account, so their passkeys belong to them.
- A strong passphrase for that account. Generate five or six random words with the passphrase generator, write it on paper and keep it somewhere safe at home.
- A second device. A tablet or old phone signed in to the same sync account means a lost phone is an inconvenience, not a lockout.
- Turn on passkeys for email and banking together. Sit with them for the first two, so the confirmation prompt becomes familiar.
- Explain the one rule. A real site will ask them to confirm with their face, fingerprint or PIN. It will never ask them to type a code from a text message into a page they reached from an email link.
- Write down recovery steps. Which account to sign in to on a new phone, and who to call. Keep it with the passphrase.
Shared family accounts, such as a streaming service, are the one place where a password in a shared password manager vault is still easier than a passkey. That is fine, as long as the password is unique and random.
A worked plan: moving ten accounts in one evening
Most people can move their ten most important accounts to passkeys or unique passwords in about an hour. Here is a realistic plan, in order of risk.
| Order | Account | Action |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Sync account (Apple, Google, Microsoft or password manager) | New passphrase, second factor, add passkey |
| 2 | Main email | Add passkey, sign out other sessions |
| 3 | Bank | Add passkey if offered, else new random password |
| 4 | Second bank or card | Same as above |
| 5 | Mobile phone carrier | New random password, add a port-out PIN |
| 6 | Largest shopping account | Add passkey |
| 7 | Social media | Add passkey or security key |
| 8 | Cloud files and photos | Add passkey |
| 9 | Work account | Follow your employer's method |
| 10 | Government or tax account | Strong unique password plus the second factor offered |
For every account that does not offer a passkey yet, use a different random password of at least 16 characters and save it in your password manager. Check any password you are unsure about with the strength checker, which can test it against known breaches without sending it.
Common myths about passkeys
The most common myth is that passkeys send your fingerprint or face to the website. They do not: biometrics only release the key on your own device, and the website never receives them.
- "The website gets my fingerprint." No. The website gets a signature made by your private key. Your face or fingerprint stays on your device.
- "If I lose my phone I lose my accounts." Not with synced passkeys, which restore on a new device through your sync account. Device-bound passkeys need a backup, which is why you should register two.
- "Passkeys are just passwords stored somewhere else." No. A password is a shared secret the server can check. A passkey's private key is never shared with the server at all.
- "MFA codes are just as good." Not against phishing. A code typed into a fake site can be relayed in real time. NIST does not count typed codes as phishing resistant.
- "Passwords will disappear soon." The data says otherwise: 57% of organisations still rely on phishable sign-in for staff, and many sites still lack passkey support.
How we compiled this
We read the FIDO Alliance's World Passkey Day 2026 announcement and the full PDF of its report The State of Passkeys 2026: Global Consumer and Workforce Report, Microsoft's 1 May 2025 security blog post on passkeys, NIST SP 800-63B-4 on pages.nist.gov, and IRS Publication 1345 (Rev. 10-2026). Survey figures are quoted as published, with sample and margin of error. The worked breach example uses this site's own crack-time assumptions, stated on each generator page. We left out passkey usage figures from vendor blogs we could not open and verify. Search interest is rising fast: DataForSEO shows US searches for "passkeys" at 74,000 in the latest month against a 60,500 yearly average, and "passkey vs password" at 8,100 against 6,600.
Questions
What is better, a passkey or a password?
A passkey, for any account that supports it. It cannot be phished, reused or cracked from a server breach. Keep strong, unique passwords for sites without passkey support and a long passphrase for your password manager.
Can I still use a password if I have a passkey?
Usually yes. Most sites keep the password as a fallback. If a site lets you remove it and you have a reliable recovery method, removing it closes a phishing route. Otherwise make the password unique and at least 16 random characters.
Are passkeys safe?
Yes. They are phishing resistant and leave only a public key on the website. Their safety depends on the account that syncs them and on your device, so protect your Apple, Google, Microsoft or password manager account with a strong passphrase and a second factor.
What happens if I lose my phone with my passkeys?
Synced passkeys come back when you sign in to your sync account on a new device. Device-bound passkeys do not, so register a second device or a hardware security key as a backup on important accounts.
Do passkeys send my fingerprint to the website?
No. Your fingerprint, face or PIN only releases the passkey on your own device. The website receives a cryptographic signature, never your biometric data.
How many people use passkeys?
The FIDO Alliance estimated 5 billion passkeys in use in May 2026, and its April 2026 survey of 11,000 consumers found 75% had enabled passkeys on at least some accounts.
Does NIST approve passkeys?
Yes, with limits. NIST SP 800-63B-4 allows synced passkeys at AAL2 and requires AAL2 verifiers to offer a phishing-resistant option, but it does not allow syncable authenticators at AAL3, which needs a non-exportable key.
Do I still need a password manager with passkeys?
Most people do. A password manager can store passkeys and the passwords for sites that do not support them yet, and lets you share credentials safely. See our Bitwarden vs 1Password comparison.
Sources
- FIDO Alliance reports accelerating global passkey adoption on World Passkey Day 2026 (7 May 2026), FIDO Alliance. Checked 19 November 2026.
- The State of Passkeys 2026: Global Consumer and Workforce Report, FIDO Alliance. Checked 19 November 2026.
- Pushing passkeys forward: Microsoft’s latest updates for simpler, safer sign-ins (1 May 2025), Microsoft Security Blog. Checked 19 November 2026.
- NIST SP 800-63B-4, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management (final, 31 July 2025), National Institute of Standards and Technology. Checked 19 November 2026.
- SP 800-63B-4 full text: sections 2.2, 3.1.7, 3.2.5 and Appendix B, National Institute of Standards and Technology. Checked 19 November 2026.
- Publication 1345, Handbook for Authorized IRS e-file Providers (Rev. 10-2026), Internal Revenue Service. Checked 19 November 2026.
- EFF Dice-Generated Passphrases and the long wordlist, Electronic Frontier Foundation. Checked 19 November 2026.